关键词: 流离生物, 负责任处置, 最低证据要求, 禁止释放情形, 生物多样性治理, 中国

Abstract

Context: Live organisms entering disposition procedures through rescue and rehabilitation, law enforcement confiscation, trade circulation, disasters, human–wildlife conflict, abandonment, and public release—referred to in this paper as “displaced organisms” — often carry substantial uncertainties regarding taxonomic identity, geographic provenance, health status, genetic background, and release-site suitability. This paper aims to define the working concepts of “displaced organisms” and “disposition of displaced organisms,” trace the evolution of international norms and identify gaps in China’s domestic institutional coordination, and propose an evidence-based tiered disposition framework. 

Analytical approach: We combined a narrative review with policy analysis, systematically examining the progressive normative logic of key International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) guidelines from 1987 to 2025, together with relevant requirements of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), and World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). We further analyzed China’s current institutional landscape, including wildlife protection, biosafety, port quarantine, invasive alien species prevention and control, stock enhancement of aquatic organisms, and animal release management. The disposition process was decomposed into eight linked stages—intake registration and evidence preservation, species and provenance confirmation, alien or invasive risk screening, quarantine and health assessment, genetic suitability assessment, behavioral and welfare and release-site assessment, tiered disposition approaches, and post-release monitoring and outcome archiving—with minimum evidence requirements proposed for each stage. 

Findings: The evolution of international norms shows four progressive emphases: preventing harmful introductions, regulating conservation translocations, addressing the disposition of individuals of unknown origin, and incorporating One Health and social governance perspectives. China’s existing legal and regulatory framework already covers some displacement scenarios, but three categories of institutional coordination gaps persist: first, intake registration, law enforcement evidence, quarantine handover, and post-release monitoring fall under different authorities without unified transfer standards; second, grassroots capacity for taxonomic identification, DNA barcoding, provenance reliability grading, and genetic suitability assessment remains insufficient; third, release-site carrying capacity, community communication, contingency planning, and archiving of failed cases are still inadequate. The core bottleneck is not a lack of general principles, but the absence of stable, recordable, and traceable procedures throughout these stages. 

Policy implications: Minimum evidence requirements and a no-release conditions list should serve as binding constraints, establishing a five-step process of “intake registration – minimum evidence review – no-release determination – tiered disposition – monitoring and archiving.” No-release conditions include: species, subspecies, or geographic provenance unconfirmable; alien species, potentially invasive species, hybrids, or genetically modified individuals; sick, injured, or unquarantined individuals; individuals purchased from markets for release; release site outside the natural distribution range or habitat unsuitable; and large-scale release projects lacking responsible entities and monitoring arrangements. For individuals deemed unsuitable for release, responsible alternatives such as long-term care, ex situ conservation, cooperative repatriation to countries of origin, non-harmful scientific research and education, and lawful humane disposition should be adopted. In the near term (1–2 years), priority should be given to formulating cross-sectoral technical guidelines with supporting forms, establishing a no-release conditions list, and launching pilot programs. In the medium term (3–5 years), a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) barcode reference library, targeted pathogen testing lists, and a national case repository should be developed. Over the long term (over 5 years), public participation should be redirected from “purchase for release” to low-risk conservation actions such as habitat restoration, invasive alien species removal, and scientific monitoring assistance, thereby transforming public conservation goodwill and law enforcement disposition pressure into verifiable biodiversity conservation outcomes.

Key words: displaced organisms, responsible disposition, minimum evidence requirements, no-release conditions, biodiversity governance, China