生物多样性 ›› 2012, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (3): 250-263.  DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1003.201214027

所属专题: 传粉生物学

• 综述 • 上一篇    下一篇

从合作的进化探讨植物与传粉者的相互作用

孙杉1, 张志强2, 张勃3, 杨永平2,*()   

  1. 1 兰州大学生命科学学院生态学研究所, 兰州 730000
    2 中国科学院昆明植物研究所生物多样性与生物地理学重点实验室, 昆明 650204
    3 甘肃农业大学草业学院, 兰州 730070
  • 收稿日期:2012-01-18 接受日期:2012-04-25 出版日期:2012-05-20 发布日期:2012-05-09
  • 通讯作者: 杨永平
  • 作者简介:*E-mail: yangyp@mail.kib.ac.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金(31100277);国家自然科学基金(31100179);中国科学院西部之光项目(292010312D11037)

Perspectives on plant-pollinator interactions from the evolution of cooperation

Shan Sun1, Zhiqiang Zhang2, Bo Zhang3, Yongping Yang2,*()   

  1. 1 Insitition of Ecology, School of Life Sciences, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000
    2 Key Laboratory of Biodiversity and Biogeography, Kunming Institute of Botany, Kunming 650204
    3 College of Pratacultural Science, Gansu Agricultural University, Lanzhou 730070
  • Received:2012-01-18 Accepted:2012-04-25 Online:2012-05-20 Published:2012-05-09
  • Contact: Yongping Yang

摘要:

合作的进化为研究植物-传粉者相互关系提供了新的视角。植物与传粉者通过“报酬换服务”建立种间合作关系。这一合作关系从建立、维持到解体面临着3个关键问题: (1)在植物和传粉者不了解对方质量信息时, 双方如何选择出最适伙伴, 进而建立合作关系; (2)合作方如何限制欺骗策略(比如, 盗蜜和欺骗性传粉)的扩散以维持合作关系; (3)什么过程可导致传粉合作关系的解体。植物与传粉者间信号博弈或筛选博弈可促进二者合作关系的建立。面对欺骗策略, 传粉者和植物分别采用伙伴选择机制和防御机制加以应对。合作者与欺骗者的稳定共存也有助于植物-传粉者合作的维持。从合作转向对抗、转向新的伙伴和合作放弃3个过程可导致植物-传粉者的合作关系的解体。植物与传粉者合作关系的理论预期已经得到了部分实验结果支持, 深化了我们对植物与传粉者合作过程中关键机制的理解。在今后的研究中, 需要进一步探讨以下问题: (1)传粉者对植物信号诚实性的选择作用和植物对传粉者的筛选作用; (2)植物与传粉者各自应对欺骗策略的可能机制及其相对重要性; (3)合作者与欺骗者稳定共存的机制; (4)植物与传粉者合作系统对全球变化的响应。

关键词: 合作, 博弈论, 收益-代价, 欺骗策略, 物种共存

Abstract

Advances in research on the evolution of cooperation has provided new insights into our understanding of plant-pollinator interactions. Plants can build a cooperative interaction with pollinators by providing a reward for the pollinators’ services. As we see it, three key questions surround the establishment, maintenance, and breakdown of plant-pollinator cooperation: (1) How can plants and pollinators recruit optimal partners within the context of deficient information about each other prior to actually establishing the interaction? (2) How can the mutualists limit the spread of cheating strategies (e.g. nectar robbing and deceit pollination) to maintain cooperative interactions? (3) What processes can lead to the breakdown of the cooperation between plants and pollinators? The signaling and screening interactions that occur between plants and pollinators could work to promote cooperation. Pollinators and plants use partner choice and defensive strategies, respectively, to cope with cheating strategies. In some situations, the stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters could be helpful to maintain the plant-pollinator cooperation. There are three processes, shifts from mutualism to antagonism, switches to novel partners and mutualism abandonment, which will cause the breakdown of plant-pollinator cooperation. We highlight experimental results that support some of the theoretical predictions discussed above. These results help to identify key mechanisms related to plant-pollinator cooperation. Four subjects for future research on plant-pollinator cooperation are highlighted in this paper: (1) selection on the honest signaling of plants by pollinators, and the effectiveness of screening mechanisms provided by plants; (2) potential mechanisms adopted by plants and pollinators for dealing with cheaters, and relative importance of these mechanisms; (3) mechanisms which allow the stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters; (4) response of plant-pollinator cooperative systems to global change.

Key words: cooperation, game theory, benefit-cost, defective strategies, species coexistence