Abstract:

Aims: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is a powerful international agreement based on an effective permit system. Its decisions, including appendix amendments, resolutions, and recommendations, have a profound impact on global wildlife conservation and trade. The rules of procedure for the Conference of the Parties (CoP), especially its voting mechanisms, are crucial to its decision-making process. This study aims to analyze these rules in detail.

Methods: This paper introduces the principles, evolution, and key controversies of CITES rules of procedure. We analyze voting data for CITES Appendix amendment proposals since CoP10 in 1997 and use key marine species votes as case studies. We then compare CITES voting rules—including voting rights, majority requirements, secret ballots, and debate reopening—with those of other biodiversity-related multilateral agreements.

Results: While other agreements often prefer consensus, CITES’s frequent use of voting allows it to make decisions more quickly. The two-thirds majority requirement for substantive issues makes it difficult for non-allied countries to achieve their goals, strengthening the influence of blocs like the European Union. Although procedural rules like secret ballots and debate reopening can lead to intense negotiations, secret ballots are vital for protecting the interests of small and medium-sized countries. While frequent voting can speed up trade regulation, it may also lead to a lack of financial or technical support, hindering effective implementation and undermining international cooperation.