Abstract:

Background: The unique regulatory structure of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) determines its important role in the international cooperation process for endangered species conservation. Trade controls and corresponding sanctions are centered around species in Appendices, which makes their inclusion or removal critical. The volume and passage rate of proposals to amend the Appendices can be one of the important indicators of each party’s influence in this field. 

Main Content: This paper is based on proposals for Appendices amendment presented from the third to the nineteenth Conference of the Parties (CoP) of CITES, and it focuses on the differences in proposal submitting and proposal passage rate of down-listing animals between developed and developing parties. The analysis reveals that developed parties had more influence on CITES decisions, which may bring dilemmas to local conservation schemes of developing parties. The voting results of the CoP show a tendency to tighten or maintain trade restrictions in cases involving “charming species”. Based on the cases of giraffe and African elephant, the paper analyzed the two reasons of tighten regulatory trend of voting, i.e. the differences in the status of species and the capacity for management in various countries, as well as the underlying interest games. This paper also briefly introduces the recent discussion of the CoP on improving the “one country one vote” mechanism. 

Conclusion: The influence of developed parties is apparently higher than developing parties on Appendices proposals, such unequal distribution of influence is closely related to the voting scheme, i.e. one country one vote. The paper provides insights and references for China and other species range countries to participate in the negotiation of relevant issues of CITES.

Key words: Appendices of CITES, proposals of species, influence of parties, trade regulatory, voting scheme