从缔约方对CITES附录提案的影响力差异探讨表决机制的完善

  • 季伟 ,
  • 周志华 ,
  • 连佑敏 ,
  • 徐畅宁
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  • 1.上海市野生动植物保护协会,上海 200065

    2.国家林业和草原局野生动物保护监测中心,北京 100714

    3.青岛大学法学院,青岛 266071

    4.上海政法学院,上海 201701

收稿日期: 2025-07-02

  修回日期: 2025-09-06

  录用日期: 2025-10-02

  网络出版日期: 2025-10-02

Analysis on the influence differentiation among parties on proposals to amend CITES Appendices and discussion on improving the voting scheme

  • Wei Ji ,
  • Zhihua Zhou ,
  • Youmin Lian ,
  • Changning Xu
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  • 1 Shanghai Wildlife Conservation Association, Shanghai 200065, China

    2 Wildlife Conservation and Monitoring Center, National Forestry and Grassland Administration, Beijing 100714, China

    3 School of Law, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China

    4 Shanghai University Of Political Science and LawShanghai 201701China

Received date: 2025-07-02

  Revised date: 2025-09-06

  Accepted date: 2025-10-02

  Online published: 2025-10-02

摘要

《濒危野生动植物种国际贸易公约》(CITES)特有的规制结构决定了它在濒危物种保护国际合作进程中的重要地位。其贸易管控和相应制裁都围绕附录物种展开,因此附录物种的列入或移出十分关键。修订附录物种的提案数量和通过率可以作为判断各缔约方在该领域影响力大小的重要指标之一。本文基于CITES第三届至第十九届缔约方大会上的附录修订提案,重点分析了发达国家缔约方和发展中国家缔约方在提案提交和降级类动物提案通过率上存在的差异,认为发达国家缔约方对公约决策有更强的影响力,而这些决策可能对发展中国家缔约方的本土保护方案带来困境。缔约方大会的表决结果显示,在涉及“魅力”物种的情况下,倾向于采取收紧或维持贸易限制的立场。文章结合长颈鹿和非洲象两个案例,讨论了表决结果倾向于加强贸易限制的两大原因,即各国物种状况和管理能力的差异,及背后的利益博弈。发达国家缔约方对附录提案的影响力显著强于发展中国家缔约方,与一国一票的表决机制密切相关。本文简要介绍了缔约方大会对改进一国一票机制的近期讨论。本文为我国及其他物种分布国参与CITES相关议题谈判提供了启示和参考。

本文引用格式

季伟 , 周志华 , 连佑敏 , 徐畅宁 . 从缔约方对CITES附录提案的影响力差异探讨表决机制的完善[J]. 生物多样性, 0 : 2025255 . DOI: 10.17520/biods.2025255

Abstract

Background: The unique regulatory structure of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) determines its important role in the international cooperation process for endangered species conservation. Trade control and corresponding sanctions centered around species in Appendices, making their inclusion or removal critical. The volume and passage rate of proposals to amend the Appendices can be one of the important indicators of each party's influence in this field.

Main Content: This paper is based on proposals for Appendices amendment presented during the third to the nineteenth Conference of the Parties (CoP) of CITES, and it focuses on the differences in proposal submitting and proposal passage rate of down-listing animals between developed and developing parties. Developed parties had more influence on CITES decisions, which may bring dilemmas to local conservation schemes of developing parties. The voting results of the Conference of the Parties show a tendency to tighten or maintain trade restrictions in cases involving "charming species". Based on the cases of giraffe and African elephant, the author analyzed the two reasons of tighten regulatory trend of voting, i.e. the differences in the status of species and the capacity for management in various countries, as well as the underlying interest games.

Conclusion: The influence of developed parties apparently higher than developing parties on Appendix proposals, such unequal distribution of influence is closely related to the voting scheme, i.e. one country one vote. This paper briefly introduced the recent discussion of the Conference of the Parties on improving the one country one vote” mechanism. The paper provides insights and references for China and other species range states to participate in the negotiation of relevant issues of CITES.
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