从缔约方对CITES附录提案的影响力差异探讨表决机制的完善
1.上海市野生动植物保护协会,上海 200065
2.国家林业和草原局野生动物保护监测中心,北京 100714
3.青岛大学法学院,青岛 266071
4.上海政法学院,上海 201701
收稿日期: 2025-07-02
修回日期: 2025-09-06
录用日期: 2025-10-02
网络出版日期: 2025-10-02
Analysis on the influence differentiation among parties on proposals to amend CITES Appendices and discussion on improving the voting scheme
1 Shanghai Wildlife Conservation Association, Shanghai 200065, China
2 Wildlife Conservation and Monitoring Center, National Forestry and Grassland Administration, Beijing 100714, China
3 School of Law, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
4 Shanghai University Of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 201701,China
Received date: 2025-07-02
Revised date: 2025-09-06
Accepted date: 2025-10-02
Online published: 2025-10-02
季伟 , 周志华 , 连佑敏 , 徐畅宁 . 从缔约方对CITES附录提案的影响力差异探讨表决机制的完善[J]. 生物多样性, 0 : 2025255 . DOI: 10.17520/biods.2025255
Background: The unique regulatory structure of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) determines its important role in the international cooperation process for endangered species conservation. Trade control and corresponding sanctions centered around species in Appendices, making their inclusion or removal critical. The volume and passage rate of proposals to amend the Appendices can be one of the important indicators of each party's influence in this field.
Main Content: This paper is based on proposals for Appendices amendment presented during the third to the nineteenth Conference of the Parties (CoP) of CITES, and it focuses on the differences in proposal submitting and proposal passage rate of down-listing animals between developed and developing parties. Developed parties had more influence on CITES decisions, which may bring dilemmas to local conservation schemes of developing parties. The voting results of the Conference of the Parties show a tendency to tighten or maintain trade restrictions in cases involving "charming species". Based on the cases of giraffe and African elephant, the author analyzed the two reasons of tighten regulatory trend of voting, i.e. the differences in the status of species and the capacity for management in various countries, as well as the underlying interest games.
Conclusion: The influence of developed parties apparently higher than developing parties on Appendix proposals, such unequal distribution of influence is closely related to the voting scheme, i.e. one country one vote. This paper briefly introduced the recent discussion of the Conference of the Parties on improving the “one country one vote” mechanism. The paper provides insights and references for China and other species range states to participate in the negotiation of relevant issues of CITES./
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